

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

*with
leg*

12 JUN 1989

OCA 1894-89

Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Board Member
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Brzezinski:

Enclosed are talking points regarding the Agency's position on the proposal by Senator Specter to establish a Director of National Intelligence. I understand that you requested this position paper after discussing the matter with the Director at a President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board meeting.

If I can be of further assistance in describing the Agency's position on this matter, please give me a call at

[Redacted]

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Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

E. Norbert Garrett
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

OCA/LEG/ [redacted] (9 June 1989)

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CIA POSITION PAPER ON DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

CIA is opposed to the creation of a Director of National Intelligence for the following reasons:

- o A Director of National Intelligence (DNI) would not have the resources to allow him to effectively supervise all the intelligence agencies in the Government. He would be a general without troops and would likely become isolated from the rest of the Intelligence Community.
- o Without a base of support, a DNI would not be as well informed about intelligence matters as would a DCI who could draw upon the resources of the Agency.
- o A DNI without troops could easily become a figurehead, who would be ineffective in carrying out his assigned responsibilities.
- o The ability of the DNI to effectively participate in the national estimate process would be diminished because he would not have the "hands on" access to, and understanding of, the full range of intelligence activities that provide all-source reporting for national estimates.
- o If the analytical function is stripped from the CIA and given to the DNI, it would increase the natural gulf between analysts and operations officers. This would lead to less detailed information being provided to analysts, and to less relevant analysis as a result.
- o A DNI would tend to duplicate many of the intelligence policy functions performed by the National Security Adviser.
- o The substantive judgments of a DNI as the President's principal intelligence adviser and as head of the Intelligence Community would be accorded less weight than the substantive judgment of the DCI because the DCI's institutional base gives him more credibility within the Intelligence Community.
- o Creating a Director of National Intelligence would establish another unnecessary layer of bureaucracy.

- o The need for the creation of a Director of National Intelligence has not been demonstrated. Proponents of the DNI argue that it is necessary to separate the function of providing objective intelligence from the function of implementing covert action so as to minimize the chance that intelligence estimates will be altered to support a covert action. Such separation already exists in CIA. Intelligence estimates are done by the Directorate of Intelligence, while covert actions are undertaken by the Directorate of Operations. Separating the two functions in two Directorates helps to prevent intelligence estimates from being altered to support a particular covert action.
- o Proponents of the DNI also argue that it is necessary to create such a position so as to prevent a DCI from formulating foreign policy and then changing intelligence estimates to support that particular foreign policy. The assumption that CIA formulates foreign policy is incorrect. Director Webster has stated that the formulation of foreign policy is not a proper function of the CIA. As long as this point is clearly understood within the Executive Branch, the creation of a DNI is not necessary.

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